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While the environmental movement in southern Taiwan exemplifies the recent worldwide 
trend of social movements with participants seeking local identity and autonomy in an 
increasingly global but deterritorialized world, it also has distinctive local characteristics 
derived from Taiwan‘s unique geo-political history. In Taiwan, environmental movements 
were an integral part of the larger process of democratization. In their effort to create a 
cleaner and greener environment, green activists in Kaohsiung, the second largest city in 
Taiwan, set up examples of citizen participation and assisted in establishing within the 
existing administrative framework formal mechanisms for public involvement. More 
crucially, via the language of ecological conservation, they helped to create a powerful 
political discourse that not only fundamentally challenged the central government‘s 
legitimacy, but also forced the country to rethink and refashion the foundation of Taiwan‘s 
national identity that, in turn, aided the efforts of environmental preservation. [urban 
development, environmentalism, social movement, civil society, Kaohsiung, Taiwan] 
 
The rivers of Kaohsiung are dead. The color of the ocean is darkened. The sky is 
contaminated. The mountains are about to die. It is our responsibility to do this, to push 
forth the birth of the Wei-wu Park, to leave our offspring with a beautiful plot of land. We are 
here to strike the first blaze of the Southern Green Revolution. We will carry the torch of its 
spirit and, from Kaohsiung, ignite the fire to the whole country.  
Writer and newspaper editor Wu Chin-fa, 
a founding member of Kaohsiung’s 





Meant to be provocative, the term ―Southern Green Revolution‖was coined by 
Kaohsiung-based writer and newspaper editor Wu Chin-fa to refer to a stream of urban 
environmental activisms organized and executed primarily by middle-class professionals 
(including writers/journalists, educators, doctors, architects, and artists) in southern Taiwan 
since the early 1990s. Different from environmental movements in the 1980s that 
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tended to be victims‘ movements with short-term objectives—frequently seeking monetary 
compensations for existing injuries, sickness, or loss of people‘s property—and provided 
limited opportunities to challenge the dominant power structure, activists in the ―Southern 
Green Revolution‖ engaged environmental and social issues. They carried broader goals for 
social transformation such as democracy, citizen participation in policy making, human rights, 
gender and ethnic equality, and environmental protection. They advocated alternative visions 
of development, and were devoted to limits to growth and quality of life (Hsiao, Milbrath and 
Weller 1995:101). 
 
In the larger context, the Southern Green Revolution refers to a broad coalition of 
organizations and individuals in southern Taiwan that includes the cities and counties of 
Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung. The concern of the movement is not limited to urban 
problems but includes regional issues such as the restoration of Kaoping River (Shie 2004; 
Tseng 2000) and the anti-dam movement in Meinung (Meinung People‘s Association 1994). 
In this article, however, I focus on the creation of urban parks in Kaohsiung City, the second 
largest city in Taiwan with a population of 1.5 million that is also the country‘s hub of heavy 
industry and a world-class port,
2
 and examine the transformative effects that the Southern 
Green Revolution had on Kaohsiung and, further, how the change in Kaohsiung yielded a 
chain of impact on Taiwanese society.
3
 While the environmental movement was, first and 
foremost, intended to create a cleaner and greener environment amongst Kaohsiung‘s 
notorious industrial pollution, this article argues that it also belongs to the recent worldwide 
trend of social movements with participants seeking local identity and autonomy in an 
increasingly global but deterritorialized world (Nash 2005). Yet, Taiwan has its own 
predicament, derived from a unique geo-political history, that gives its social movements a 
local essence. In Taiwan where authoritarianism ruled political life into the late 1980s, 
environmentalism was never simply about the environment but also a close ally of the 
country‘ democratization movement (Ho 2003a; Lee and So 1999:303). Activists of the 
Southern Green Revolution not only set up examples of citizen participation but, further, 
assisted in establishing within the existing administrative framework formal mechanisms for 
public involvement (Hsiao, Chiang, Chi, Chu, Lin 2005:191–213). More crucially, via the 
language of ecological conservation, they helped to create a powerful political discourse that 
not only fundamentally challenged the central government‘s legitimacy, but also forced the 
country to rethink and refashion the foundation of Taiwan‘s national identity that, in turn, 
aided the efforts of environmental preservation.  
 
Taiwan and global environmental movements 
 
Castells (1996:377–428) postulates that a fundamental opposition emerged in the current 
process of globalization between two spatial logics: one about flows that organizes the 
simultaneity of social practices from afar by means of telecommunication and information 
systems and the other about places that privileges social interaction and institutional 
organization on the basis of physical continuity. While the former is taking precedence 
over the latter, a disjunction between the global and the local is created as a result. Local 
places gradually lost the ability to represent themselves as well as to govern their own affairs 
3 
 
to remote, unaccountable business interests, governments, or international governance bodies. 
In response, recent social movements, particularly environmental movements, in the world 
have placed emphasis on locality and on the control by people of their living spaces. 
Grassroots democracy is the political model in most of these movements (Castells 
1997:124–125). Similarly, Nash (2005) emphasizes the growing autonomy sought by 
participants in recent social movements around the globe. In the current world order 
where homogeneity is increasingly demanded and necessitated, and differences are 
eliminated, cultural identity and expressions are resources of social mobilization in the sense 
that they ―provide an ever-changing frame of reference that animate social movements and 
serve to validate the changes they institute or the revitalization of an imagined past without 
conflict‖ (Nash 2005:13). Subsequently, the claims for autonomy and the right to cultural 
diversity pose the ultimate challenge to the homogenizing world order (Nash 2005:10).  
 
The environmental movement in Taiwan dovetails with the trends identified by both 
Castells (1997) and Nash (2005), but with distinct local characteristics. First appearing as a 
response to Taiwan‘s worsening environmental problems due to the country‘s ruthless 
industrialization, the environmental movement quickly joined forces with other social 
movements emerging since the early 1980s to challenge the Nationalist Party‘s (Kuomintang 
[KMT]) authoritarian rule that based its legitimacy on a China-centered national ideology. 
The hesitation of the Taiwan government to suppress with coercive means many of these 
movements (including the environmental movement) gave rise to an array of collective action 
repertories that helped to create a ―public sphere‖ which ―political dissidents and social 
activists could utilize to facilitate the reorganization of political structures‖(Hsiao 1999:41; 
also Tang 2003; Tang and Tang 1997; 1999). Taiwanese sociologist Hsinhuang Michael Hsiao 
(1999:41) points out that the significance of Taiwan‘s environmental movement rested on its 
omnipresence and direct impact on local politics. This is particularly meaningful given that 
the KMT as a political party did not simply control the political life of the Taiwanese but, 
through political maneuvering, it also acted as a major player and investor in especially 
upstream industries of a monopolized nature such as petrochemicals. The Taiwan state capital 
and the KMT party capital were often one and the same or, at least, interchangeable under 
this circumstance (Wang 1995). The term ―party-state capitalism‖ was coined to depict this 
particular mode of capital accumulation (Wang 1993). The locally motivated, self-organized 
environmental protests, with demands of localized decision-making and resource 
redistribution, thus had the potential to affect both of Taiwan‘s political structure and 
economic system (Tung 2006:6).  
 
Along with the call for political democratization came discussions about Taiwan‘s 
national status and cultural heritage (H. Lü 2002). Ideologically, many of the social 
movements in Taiwan since the 1980s had a strong emphasis on local culture and history. 
This was in part a result of the political opening that made permissible a conceptualization of 
a nationscape based on the land actually inhabited by the population of Taiwan and governed 
by the national government on Taiwan instead of based on an imagined, KMT-propagated, 
unified China. This was particularly important to Taiwanese-independence advocates seeking 
cultural legitimacy for an independent nation. Local historical research, in this political 
4 
 
context, was a manifestation of cultural resistance against the KMT regime (H. Lü 2002:52). 
Political-nationalist significance aside, I would argue that an emphasis on local history and 
culture had a direct bearing on the outcome of Taiwan‘s environment movements. It has been 
widely recognized that ―the success of environmentalism as a social movement depends 
largely on activists‘ ability to frame environmental issues symbolically, and to deploy 
representations of nature and society in order to persuade policy makers and other citizens to 
support their cause‖ (Harper 2005:222). This is especially crucial in Taiwan where, similar to 
the situations in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe wherein the authoritarian 
communist governments had a tight (if not total) control over the resources of the country, 
autonomous collective activities outside the realm of the state were not easy to achieve 
(Pickvance 1998; Yanitsky 1999). Effective social mobilization—or the lack thereof—under 
this circumstance was thus closely related to the presence of identity-based strategies 
(Dawson 1996). In both cases a linkage was made between environmentalism and national 
identity, only that in the former Soviet Union and many of the Eastern European countries the 
target or enemy was the imperial center of Russia (Dawson 1996; Tickle and Welsh 1998) 
and, later, a capitalist West gone wild (Harper 2005). Yet in Taiwan it was the Chinese 
Nationalist other represented by the central government located in the capital city of Taipei in 
northern Taiwan (Hou 1999; Reardon-Anderson 1997). 
 
Kaohsiung: The geography of moral legitimacy 
 
The development of Kaohsiung as an industrial center began with the Japanese who 
perceived Taiwan as a colony of high economic and military value in the expanding Japanese 
empire. While Kaohsiung has the advantage of a natural harbor, the Japanese saw it first as a 
first-class fishing and commercial port as well as a manufacturing center and later, especially 
after the onset of the Pacific War in 1941, an important military base for the empire‘s 
southward advancement. The Japanese worked out detailed plans to transform Kaohsiung 
into a modern city. They built the harbor, constructed roads and railways to connect 
Kaohsiung with the surrounding regions and the rest of the island, set up modern amenities of 
electricity and running water, and established the gridiron of streets (Chang 1995:177–237; 
Cheng and Wei 2001). By the early 1930s, they also built up industrial infrastructure 
including steel plants and oil refineries.  
 
These construction efforts were of great significance. Equipped with the port facilities 
and other infrastructure from the Japanese years, Kaohsiung quickly developed into a 
manufacturing center, and its status was becoming increasingly important corresponding to 
Taiwan‘s rapid, though harsh, industrialization, in the post-World War II era (Chang 
1995:177–237). In addition to container logistic centers, steel plants, shipyards, ship-breaking, 
scrap metal, and cement (both mining and processing) industries, when the Taiwan 
government  decided to speed up its own petrochemical industry after the oil crises in the 
1970s, Kaohsiung was chosen to be the site for this industry. As a matter of fact, the first 
naphtha cracker plant was constructed in the Kaohsiung port area in 1968, followed by a 
second one in 1971 (Hsu and Cheng 2002:902).
4
 In addition, Kaohsiung City is surrounded 
by industrial zones.
5
 In the early 1990s, there were approximately 6000 registered industrial 
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plants in Kaohsiung, with an average of 60 to 80 firms per square kilometer, a number far 
higher than the average of five to ten factories elsewhere in Taiwan. Most of these factories 
are highly polluting, and also quickly depleted local water and other resources due to the 
nature of their production. Especially the petrochemical industry requires a huge supply of 
clean water in the manufacturing process. Amid these industries, 40 chemical hazards were 
detected during the 1980s. The health of Kaohsiung City residents had been greatly 
compromised. Dr. Tseng Kui-hai, one of the founding members of Kaohsiung‘s green 
movement and a respected chest specialist, further attested that cancer had become the No. 1 
cause of death in Kaohsiung City since 1980, two years earlier than the rest of the country. 
This confirmed local activists‘ fears that Kaohsiung was not only the ―Mecca‖ of pollution, 
but had also become a ‗haven‘ of cancer (Tseng 1996:183–184). 
 
Furthermore, among the 16,300 acres of land designated as the vicinity of Kaohsiung 
City that should come under the jurisdiction of the Kaohsiung City government, only less 
than 7,000 acres are actually in the city government‘s charge. Aside from the various export 
processing zones and industrial parks overseen by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Kaohsiung has several military bases that are controlled by the Ministry of National Defense. 
Most of the harbor area is under the direct management of the Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau of 
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, which was only gradually returned to 
Kaohsiung City in the early 2000s (K‘ung-chien 2002:44).
6
 Despite the fact that Kaohsiung 
was primarily known as a harbor city, the majority of the city‘s residents, until recently, were 
never allowed to set foot near the water. All of these matters are somehow rooted in the 
Japanese colonial legacy when Kaohsiung was built to be a fishing/commercial/industrial/ 
military port according to the Japanese empire‘s blue print. As a result, neither the Kaohsiung 
City government nor the city‘s residents have full control over the destiny of their own city.  
 
Taiwan is well known for its highly decentralized industrial system, with firms and 
factories spreading to almost all corners of the country (Hsiung 1996; Hu 1984; A. Lee 2004; 
Shieh 1992). Accordingly, Taiwan‘s environmental movements are of a ubiquitous nature. 
Especially, anti-pollution protests were never limited to certain locations (Hsiao 1999:41). 
This does not mean, however, that environmental degradation is of the same enormity 
everywhere, or affects individual well-being in equal manners; neither does it mean that the 
environmental degradation is experienced or understood by people in different locales in the 
same way. Hsu and Cheng (2002) identified three distinct regional economies in Taiwan‘s 
postwar industrialization, each with its own interactive pattern of industrial organization, 
state policy, market operation, and popular action by local population and civic associations: 
labor-intensive industries in central Taiwan in the early export-oriented stage in the 1960s; 
basic, capital-intensive industries in southern Taiwan, especially around the Kaohsiung area, 
in the import-substitution period in the 1970s; and the high-tech semiconductor industry in 
northern Taiwan, centered on the Hsinchu Science Park, during the industrial upgrading in the 
1980s. In the case of Kaohsiung, the state played a crucial role in fostering the petrochemical 
industry, initially by directly using public funds to build the first few naphtha refineries and 
other necessary infrastructure and later by setting up regulatory mechanisms to reduce 
transaction costs and market uncertainties in order to encourage private capital investment 
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(Hsu and Cheng 2002:903).  
 
Under authoritarianism, without much social resistance, the polluting petrochemical and 
other related industries were developed in southern Taiwan, geographically distant from the 
political center of Taipei (Hsu and Cheng 2002:903). What is more, through granting special 
permissions to only a handful of private enterprises (most of which with a KMT-affiliation) to 
operate in the petrochemical and other heavy industries, the government not only gave a 
small group of companies a monopoly in many upstream industrial products, but also created 
close ties with a few individuals (in Kaohsiung or elsewhere) who have garnered huge profits 
from Kaohsiung yet have little regard for the city (Hsiao, Chiang, Chi, Chu and Lin 2005:191; 
Wang 1995). Furthermore, due to Taiwan‘s tax structure, the profits of these companies were 
taxed by the local government at their headquarters (i.e. Taipei) but not where the production 
actually took place (i.e. Kaohsiung). As a result, it was the Taipei City government and the 
residents of Taipei who were enjoying the fruits of these industrial endeavors, whereas the 
Kaohsiung City government and the people of Kaohsiung had to bear the consequences of 
environmental and health degradation, and the lack of city funds for public investment and 
social development. 
 
Environmental activism as citizen movement 
 
Given the differential economic policies, Kaohsiung City residents deeply felt that they 
were considered as secondary citizens, and their welfare was overlooked, by the central 
government. Environmental activists in Kaohsiung, however, did not merely reiterate the 
indignation felt by the residents in their city but epitomized through environmental and health 
costs the consequences borne by the city residents for the decisions made by policy makers in 
Taipei and the South-North inequality embedded in these decisions. Some of the activists also 
articulated the problems faced by Kaohsiung as a calamity fundamental to the capitalist mode 
of production. Borrowing the words of one of the activists well versed in Marxist analyses, 
the policy makers of the central government in Taipei treated Kaohsiung primarily as a 
―productive machine for the accumulation of the nation‘s capital‖ (Chung 1996:34). They 
were simply unsympathetic to the lives of Kaohsiung residents. Little thought was given to 
the public interests of the city. As a result, Kaohsiung was in urgent need of green space and 
cultural facilities, a citywide public sewer system, and more educational resources. 
Kaohsiung needed a better plan for urban development and zoning regulations needed to be 
more clearly addressed to the public. 
 
With these concerns in mind, the green activists in Kaohsiung embarked on two natural 
park movements, to push for the Takao Hill and Wei-wu Parks on former military land. The 
activists pressured the Kaohsiung City and County governments with a forceful discourse 
based on deeply felt local history and identity. They also attempted to sustain their 
accomplishment through citizen mobilization and participation. Ultimately, they sought to 
change the political structure by pushing to be a formal part of the policy-making body, 




The Takao Hill Natural Park movement: Initiating “public involvement” 
 
I am just a simple truck driver, and I can‘t talk big theories. [To answer your question of] 
why I became a Takao Hill volunteer tour guide, once I was driving a group of Japanese 
tourists to see the divine trees in the Southern Cross-island Expressway region, and saw some 
of the older men and women in the group bowing to the trees with reverence. I asked them 
why. They told me that it was already a rare accomplishment for any human being to grow 
old into the age of seventies: ―But look at these trees! They have lived for hundreds or 
thousands of years. [They deserve our deepest respect.]‖ 
 
Mr. Lu K’un-ming, one of the earliest 
ecological tour guides of the Takao Hill 




The environmental conservation movement in Taiwan has to be a self-initiated 
awakening process of the people. It will no doubt be slow and gradual. But only through such 
a process can the people‘s will be consolidated, a public consensus be reached, and the 
strength of resistance against suffering, exploitation, abuse, and injustice be accomplished. 
We demand that the power holders return the rights and dignity to the rightful people, and, by 
doing so, return the future to the land. 
 
Writer Wang Chia-hsiang, a founding 
 member of Kaohsiung’s Green 
 Movement (Wang 1993:269–270) 
 
The Takao Hill (or Ch‘ai-shan [Ch‘ai Mountain]) Natural Park Movement started as a 
rescue operation to save Ch‘ai-shan from over-mining by the cement industry, zealous real 
estate development by special interest groups, and a sudden and rapid increase of tourists. 
Located on the northwestern fringe of Kaohsiung City overlooking the Taiwan Strait, Takao 
Hill was designated by the Japanese military in 1907 as a ―peace preservation forest,‖ a 
protected woodland that banned the entry of ordinary people. Takao Hill continued to be a 
strategic site for defense and remained under the charge of the Taiwanese military in the 
postwar era. Only in the early 1990s, after the lift of martial law, did the military begin to 
relent its control to the civilian authority and gradually open the mountain to the public. 
Paradoxically, the nearly century-long exclusion of the general populace also protected Takao 
Hill from Kaohsiung‘s ardent industrial development in the past few decades. Towards the 
end of the twentieth century, Takao Hill was a rare wilderness and natural wonderland in 
urban Taiwan. In addition to a diverse ecosystem with native fauna and flora, Takao Hill was 
also home to groups of wild Formosan Rock Macaques, the only nonhuman primate species 
(Macaca cyclopis) indigenous to the island who was frequently referred to by the Taiwanese 





The newly granted access to Takao Hill, however, quickly drew a large influx of hikers 
and visitors, often beyond the capacity of the mountain. Many of them left garbage behind 
and took plants and herbs away with them. Some even poached the monkeys (T‘u 
1993:54–67). Also, due to the early confusion about the jurisdiction over the mountain that 
involved many as well as different levels of government agencies, Takao Hill seemed to fall 
into a state of anarchy which, in turn, made the appropriation of public land for private use 
and profits permissible. Soon enough assorted restaurants began to appear along the ridge of 
the mountain, followed by a cluster of villa-type abodes, with some of the best views 
overlooking Taiwan‘s western coastline. On a smaller scale, some regular hikers built resting 
spots, placing benches and planting strips of flowers of their liking alongside the hiking trails 
(T‘u 1993:68–75). A few of these flowers were invasive imported species and killed some 
Takao Hill‘s indigenous plants (Ch‘en 2006). Local environmental activists were also 
concerned about the fact that the limestone mining rights of the Taiwan Cement Corporation 
in the adjacent Shou-shan (Shou Mountain) was to be terminated at the end of 1992 and, as a 
result, the company had been speeding up the mining operation that was pushing too close to 
the edge of Takao Hill that shared the same geological makeup as Shou-shan (T‘u 
1993:54–67). It seemed that, after the termination of the mining rights, Taiwan Cement was 
planning on developing commercial as well as residential properties on the abandoned mining 
district. This would likely trigger a new wave of real estate development at the base of Takao 
Hill. The needs of an enlarged population would place more burdens on Takao Hill‘s already 
fragile ecosystem (Wang 1997). Under these circumstances, the grassroots Takao Hill 
Association for Natural Park (THA) was formed in May 1992, with a clear objective: to push 
for a natural park status for the newly opened Takao Hill region so that there would be a clear 
legal framework as well as government support for its conservation.  
 
Before the formation of the THA, quite a few regular Takao Hill mountain climbers, 
mostly middle-aged or retired, had on an individual basis picked up the garbage left behind 
by casual hikers, kept an eye on the monkeys and protected them from poaching or friendly 
intrusion, and carried pots of tea or water, placed them along the hiking trails, and served 
them to thirsty visitors (Wang 1993:23). They also helped to dissuade ill-disciplined tourists 
from conducting damaging behaviors. Quietly, these daily volunteers assisted in the 
preservation of Takao Hill and set up a precedent for public involvement.  
 
The initiators of the THA marveled at the volunteers‘ spontaneity and, against the 
backdrop of Taiwan‘s silenced political culture after the KMT‘s half century-long 
authoritarian rule, called for Kaohsiung City residents to follow the example of these 
volunteers and bring forth the spirit of civilian self-rule. In contrast to previous environmental 
protests whose goals tended to focus on instant retribution, Kaohsiung‘s green activists saw 
the Natural Park movement as a long-term campaign. The idea of a ―natural park‖ was 
primarily to introduce the least human intervention, thereby allowing Takao Hill‘s indigenous 
vegetation to grow and prosper on its own course; it also involved educating tourists so that 
they could be informed and join the force of conservation (Wang 1993:25). Ultimately, the 
goal was to instill among residents of Kaohsiung an awareness of the relationship between 
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the city‘s history and its natural habitat, which the green activists hoped would blossom into a 
local, ―nativistic‖ cultural consciousness powerful enough to not only oversee the city‘s own 
public affairs but also serve as the most solid political support for Kaohsiung to challenge the 
discriminatory policy of the central government in Taipei (Wang 1993:270). 
 
Takao Hill finally became a natural park in 1998. The road to success was not easy. The 
park‘s legal status has not fended off every special interest group or individual transgressor 
who has an eye on the mountain‘s land and natural resources. Activists of the THA and its 
many allies continue to have to fight for the government‘s support as well as to raise the 
public‘s awareness.
7 
Over the years, however, the THA and, later, its successor the Takao Hill 
Park Association
8
 did succeed in training a troop of ecological tour guides-volunteers, 
developing outreach programs for local schools and universities, and expanding the support 
of especially residents of Takao Hill‘s neighboring communities. Starting from 2001 the 
Takao Hill Park Association managed to secure financial and human resources to organize an 
annual one month-long Ch‘ai-shan Festival, each year with activities centering on a plant or 
animal species significant to the ecosystem of Takao Hill. Through all these efforts, ―natural 
park‖ is no longer an alien concept but has become part of the daily vocabulary that requires 
the attention of both Kaohsiung City residents and the city government. 
 
The Wei-wu Park movement: Building an “ecological city” 
 
If the Takao Hill Natural Park Movement built its success on raising public awareness 
and enticing Kaohsiung residents in the actual practice of environmental conservation, the 
Wei-wu Park Movement focused its battle primarily on government agencies and public 
(especially elected) officials, and strived to achieve its goal by face-to-face dialogue and 
persuasion (Hsiao, Chiang, Chi, Chu and Lin 2005:209–210; Lü 2004).
9
 Ideologically, 
activists of the Wei-wu Park Movement, many of them also active THA members, also helped 
to advance a South-based ecological-cum-political discourse.10 
 
Similar to Takao Hill‘s military status, Camp Wei-wu was an army barrack during the 
Japanese period while still a marsh area on the fringe of Kaohsiung City. After World War II 
Camp Wei-wu continued to serve as a military training center, until 1979 when it was deemed 
by the government as no longer fit for its original purpose. This opened the opportunity for 
debate about the redevelopment of the 67 acres of land that is now a parcel of valuable urban 
property in the center of metropolitan Kaohsiung. As a result, various proposals were offered 
by the local governments in southern Taiwan, elected officials at all levels, business groups, 
scholars and urban planners, ranging from using the land for public housing, commercial real 
estate, a trade center, a new Kaohsiung city government office complex, to a university. 
However, the Ministries of National Defense and of the Interior, the two central government 
agencies overseeing Camp Wei-wu, insisted on using the land to construct military family 
housing (Hsieh 1997; Yeh 2005). The argument went on for years. 
 
Amid these wrangles the Wei-wu Park Promotion Association (WPPA) was founded in 
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March 1992, advocating the establishment of a natural park on the site of Camp Wei-wu. The 
task of the WPPA, however, was different from that of the THA. While Takao Hill had been a 
secluded forest in need of conservation, Camp Weiwu was virtually a man-made environment 
after nearly a century of active military service. To establish a natural park on Camp Wei-wu 
meant to create a natural habitat almost from scratch. Yet, this shortage also became a 
powerful rally point. In August 1994 at a WPPA-organized public hearing on the planning of 
the Wei-wu park, Wu Chin-fa, then a chief editor of the Commons Daily, a major local 
newspaper, voiced the ultimate concern of Kaohsiung‘s green activists: 
 
―We don‘t want just any park. What we want is a park with a southern perspective. The 
 flora planted in the park has to be an integral part of the southern ecosystem, and the 
 plants have to be original to Kaohsiung so that we can breed them locally and not import 
 them from elsewhere.The central government in Taipei has always imposed the 
 knowledge and worldview developed in the north on other parts of Taiwan. But we say 
 no more‖ (K‘ung-chien 1994). 
 
Local folklorist and conservationist Hung T‘ien-chun continued to elaborate at the public 
hearing: 
 
―To recreate a natural habitat with Camp Wei-wu-based ecological characteristics, we 
 urge that the Construction and Planning Commission [responsible for the park 
 construction] contact the Endemic Species Research Institute and the Taiwan Forestry 
 Research Institute in order to establish a seedling of native species… Given that Camp 
 Wei-wu used to be a marsh, we should also recreate a wetland environment, so that the 
 park can, once again, attract fireflies, geese, ducks, and Pheasant-tailed Jacanas that are 
 indigenous to Taiwan… Also, there used to be many Sika Deer [a Taiwan-only species] 
 in the earlier history of Formosa [that we should bring back]… Only by restoring the 
 park to its original state, can we rebuild an ecosystem with a rich diversity that is truly 
 Taiwanese and can we call this a worthy project‖ (K‘ung-chien 1994).  
 
Clearly articulated in the words of these southern environmental activists was the idea that 
the locally motivated, grassroots conservation movement was, and should be, an extension of 
the larger struggle to awaken a native cultural consciousness rooted in Taiwan (Wang 
1993:267). 
 
Through the WPPA‘s tireless efforts of lobbying, public relations building, information 
dissemination, and public hearings and other events—most of which were new and rare up to 
this point in Taiwan‘s local self-governance—in 1993 the central government agreed that the 
vacant land of Camp Wei-wu should be reserved for park use. However, the battle was far 
from over. Owing to the limited fiscal resources particularly at the local government level, 
the Wei-wu Park remained a plan on paper (Hsieh 1997). The WPPA, along with other local 
activist groups, continuously fought administrative foot dragging and pushed hard for the 
realization of the park plan, at times with great frustration (T. Lü 2004). In 1998 Frank Hsieh 
of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the elected mayor of 
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Kaohsiung. In 2000 Chen Shui-bian, also of DPP, ran on a South-based, Taiwan-centered 
campaign platform and won the presidential election which ended more than fifty years of the 
KMT rule on Taiwan and marked the first time in history an opposition candidate took over 
power democratically in a Chinese state. These changes brought about substantial allocation 
of government funding to the Wei-wu Park construction and other public projects in 
Kaohsiung and elsewhere in southern Taiwan. 
 
Transformation in Kaohsiung 
 
So often we talk to our kids about the love to our native land. After a while, the talk 
simply becomes a sham, since we never teach them anything about the place they actually 
live. I am not opposed to teaching Yellow River, Yangtze River, in school. But before 
teaching our children Yellow River or Yangtze River, shouldn‘t we tell them about our own 
Takao Hill and Ai River? They shouldn‘t be just feeling happy from visiting the monkeys. 
There is so much more that we could teach them. There is this rich history and culture that 
they should know. 
 
Writer and newspaper editor 




In a discussion of the relationship between urban public space and the public sphere, 
Harvey (2006) cautions against premature optimism over the existence of the former as an 
evidence of the latter. Given that cities around the globe are increasingly entrenched in an 
unstable economic environment characterized by transnational capital that is highly mobile 
and speculative, they are forced to engage in fierce rivalry, taking on strategies such as 
place-making, to secure jobs and investment (Brenner and Theodore 2002:367; Smith 2002). 
The appearance of public space, therefore, may be more a result of inter-urban competition 
rather than a sign of the public sphere (cf. Harvey 1989:12; Peck and Tickell 2002:393). As 
such, ―[c]ontestation over the construction, meaning, and organization of public space only 
takes effect… When it succeeds in exercising a transformative influence over private and 
commercial [or other institutional] spaces‖ (Harvey 2006:32). The current development in 
Kaohsiung seems to attest to Harvey‘s warning, as there is no denial that the recent change in 
Kaohsiung‘ s urban landscape was also a process of assets transformation and reuse 
(Kaohsiung City Bureau of Public Works 2002; K‘ung-chien 2002). Charles Lin, 
Director-General of Kaohsiung City Bureau of Public Works, noted in a 2002 magazine 
interview that urban redevelopment, including the creation of green space like parks and 
recreational waterfronts, was a strategy sought actively by the Kaohsiung City government in 
its attempt to revitalize the city‘s economy after it was hard hit by Taiwan‘s recent economic 
restructuring (mainly deindustrialization) (Dialogue 2002; A. Lee 2004; Lin 2003; Wang 
2004). This may have explained the city government‘s willingness to cooperate with local 
activist groups in recent years. As a result of urban renewal, property values around places 
like Takao Hill or Camp Wei-wu have risen, thereby enriching a few home owners and real 




Nonetheless, I would argue that the environmental activists‘ efforts transformed the city 
and had a large impact on other parts of Taiwan, especially the south. This is not because they 
succeeded in overhauling the logic of capital. Rather, by grounding their campaigns and 
vindications on Taiwan‘s historical-spatial inequality, they managed to upset the dominant 
political ideology, which, in turn, provided a conduit to a participatory practice in the 
governance of everyday decisions whose effect could be gradually felt by ordinary citizens 
(cf. Nash 2005:13). One might argue, however, that this achievement was at least aided 
by—if not exactly a part of—the Taiwan government‘s concerted effort of 
community-building as a means to deepen Taiwan‘s democracy as well as to forge 
a consensus on Taiwanese (national) identity (H. Lü 2002; Tung 2006:197–198). Specifically, 
the southern green activists might have benefited both financially and administratively from 
the Integrated Community-Making Program, a state-sponsored community development 
project enacted by the Council of Cultural Affairs in 1994 that urged local governments to 
incorporate into their public policy grassroots initiatives and channeled funds directly to 
support locally instigated cultural activities (cf. Chuang 2005). In other words, critically 
speaking, the Southern Green Revolution was not a citizen movement completely 
independent from the state. Yet, given the lack of material resources in the non-governmental 
sector primarily due to the state‘s authoritarian rule until recently, grassroots activists or 
organizations were constantly forced to solicit funding from the government.
12
 In spite 
of this financial predicament, the initiatives of social reform still had to come from the 
grassroots activists themselves. Furthermore, their endeavor was followed by activist groups 
and municipal governments elsewhere, and popularized particularly in southern Taiwan, as a 
model of urban redevelopment. Together, this trend helped to create a public forum where a 
locally based, Taiwan-centered discourse was made powerful enough to influence the election 
results at both the local and central levels, which further engendered the possibility of 
alternative visions about the future that were different from past state projects. 
 
On the experiential level, Kaohsiung residents quickly noticed changes in their city‘s 
landscape. It is apparent from my field research that many are genuinely pleased with the 
increase of green, open spaces and the growing number of free cultural, performance 
activities taking place on these spaces. Now they have more things to do and more places to 
go, either for day trips or simply to have a morning outdoor exercise before going to work or 
to take a stroll in the neighborhood. As an indication of the citizens‘ appreciation, Mayor 
Frank Hsieh‘s approval rating was 78 % in 2004, after six years on the job, rising from 
12.6 % in 2000, the second year into his tenure (China Post 2000; Huang 2004). It also 
becomes clear from the many conversations I had in Kaohsiung that residents now take great 
pride in their city. I was often told how nowadays one could invite friends to visit Kaohsiung 
with confidence because there were many places to take them, whereas in earlier years one 
was hesitant even if a friend offered to come to Kaohsiung voluntarily. Many taxi drivers 
testified to the surging number of tourists. Lately, changes in Kaohsiung also caught the 
attention of national media (all based in Taipei). A 2004 survey in Global Views, a leading 
Taiwanese monthly business magazine, named Kaohsiung Taiwan‘s second most attractive 
city, and placed it the fifth among Taiwanese cities with distinctive architecture 





With surging self-confidence comes a renewed identity to the city. How this new identity 
was taken by many as the first step to make a better life became evident during the course of 
my research. Only when one identified with—and loved—one‘s own city, I was often told, 
could one begin to commit to the city‘s cause of building a better future. The awakening of 
this communal spirit is essential to the ongoing success of Kaohsiung‘s green activists. While 
the activists succeeded in taking part in the Kaohsiung Urban Planning Commission, and 
pushed the Kaohsiung City government to establish a ―Community Architect System‖ in 
2002 to localize community development decisions,
13
 they relied on the continual support 
and mobilization of Kaohsiung City residents to exert pressure on the government. Grassroots 
democracy is a process of mutual reinforcement. 
 
The most significant impact of Kaohsiung‘s green movement, however, remains its 
creation of a powerful rhetoric that resonated with the discontent of the larger Taiwanese 
society especially in the south. Environmental movements had always been an integral part of 
the democratization movement, which, in essence, was to de-legitimize the KMT rule on 
which Taiwan‘s infamous party-state capitalism was founded and many of the 
environmentally destructive industrial policies were formulated (Tu n.d.). The local challenge 
to the KMT domination through elections was well underway in the 1980s. It was in part 
within this context that the ―Southern Green Revolution‖ discourse was able to emerge. Yet, 
the call for a ―Southern Green Revolution‖ also provided a focal point around which further 
political mobilization could rally. I would argue that the environmental activists‘ efforts 
helped to consolidate the local sentiment that ultimately led to the victory of Chen Shui-bian 
in the 2000 presidential election and the change in political regime in Taiwan (Chen won the 
reelection in 2004). This in turn considerably reinforced the significance of local governance 






In the past few decades, two important and complementary—but at times 
competing—models have emerged that give insight to the question of social mobilization 
(Dawson 1996:10). On the one hand, resource mobilizational theories focus on how, 
structurally, the access to mobilizational resources and the availability of mobilizational 
opportunities shape the patterns of mobilization. On the other hand, identity-based 
approaches emphasize the role of culture, ideas, and group identity in explaining the rise 
and process of social mobilization. Recent research on Taiwan‘s environmental movements 
(e.g., Ho 2003b; 2004; 2005a 2005b; T. Lü 2004; Sie 2004) tended to adopt the former 
approach and focused on the question of political alliance (or the lack thereof) between 
political parties, government officials, and environmental/social activists. The issue at stake 
was whether a civil society could emerge in Taiwan and how we could understand its nature 
given the country‘s young and burgeoning democracy and the grassroots organizations‘ 
continuous reliance on government resources, which bears a broader significance to the 
understanding of social activism particularly in contemporary post-authoritarian countries. 
14 
 
This article, however, chooses to emphasize the second approach and, through the creation of 
urban parks in Kaohsiung, examines the role that national/cultural identity played in the 
success of a social movement. 
 
The environmental movement in Kaohsiung exemplifies the recent worldwide trend of 
social movements with participants seeking local identity and autonomy in an increasingly 
global but deterritorialized world (Castells 1996; 1997; Nash 2005) but with distinct local 
characteristics. After more than a decade of effort, Kaohsiung‘s green activists not only set 
examples of citizen participation but, further, assisted in establishing within the existing 
administrative framework formal mechanisms for public involvement. Their example is now 
followed by activist groups and municipal governments elsewhere, and popularized 
particularly in southern Taiwan, as a model of urban redevelopment. More crucially, via the 
language of ecological conversation, they helped to create a powerful political discourse that 
not only fundamentally challenged the central government‘s legitimacy, but also forced the 
country to rethink and refashion the foundation of Taiwan‘s national identity that, in turn, 
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1
All translations in the following are mine. 
2
The population of the Greater Kaohsiung area, however, is around 2.75 million. In 
comparison, Taipei, the largest city and capital of Taiwan, has approximately 2.6 million 
residents; the population of metropolitan Taipei amounts to 6.5 million. The total population 
of Taiwan, (September 2004), was about 22 million, and the population density was 626 
persons per square kilometer. The size of the country is 36,179 square kilometers 
(Government Information Office [GIO] 2006). 
3
This paper is a part of the larger project in which I examine urban development in Taipei and 
Kaohsiung in the context of current global economic competition and local/national political 
contention. In addition to secondary data such as media and environmental movement 
accounts, for this paper, I interviewed key figures in Kaohsiung‘s environmental groups 
including the Takao Green Association for Ecology and Human Studies, the Takao Hill 
Association for Natural Park, the Takao Hill Park Association, Wetlands Taiwan, and the 
Alliance of Kao-Pin River Restoration. Some of these individuals were directly involved in 
the Southern Green Revolution, although they are no longer active in the present 
environmental movement. They provided me with their personal experience and insights. 
Others were too junior in the early 1990s to play a principal role in the Southern Green 
15 
 
Revolution, but have since then become major actors in the environmental and other social 
movements in southern Taiwan. Because of their current activism, they were able to evaluate 
the effect of the Southern Green Revolution on the present state of social movements in 
southern Taiwan. 
4
A naphtha cracker plant is usually large and highly polluting; it refines oil products into 
precursors of plastics, perhaps the most important industrial product in Taiwan‘s economy 
until recently. 
5
The Jen-wu Ta-she Industrial Park is located in the northeast of Kaohsiung City, the Tainan 
scrap metal industrial park is in the north, the Lin-yuan Petrochemical Industrial Park is in the 
south, and the Niaosung Industrial Park (with a concentration of leather-tanning factories) is 
in the east. 
6
The Ministries of Economic Affairs, National Defense, and Transportation and 
Communications are all central government agencies that answer to the prime minister of the 
Executive Yuan. 
7
For example, see the website of the Ecological Education Center of the Kaohsiung City 
Teachers‘ Association (http://eec.kta.org.tw) and the homepage of the Takao Hill Park 
Association (http://home.kimo.com.tw/tha_home). 
8
The Takao Hill Park Association was founded in March 2001 by THA activists. The THA 
was essentially dissolved, or transformed into this new organization. The Takao Hill Park 
Association is an officially registered nonprofit organization, as opposed to the earlier THA 
that was a spontaneous civil group. The change in name reflects the new priority and 
direction now that Takao Hill has become a natural park. The official non-profit status of the 
renewed Takao Hill Park Association also reflects the new relationship between the Taiwan 
government and the civil society in the new millennium, which is no longer hostile but at 
times cooperative. 
9
For a personal account of the early struggle of the Wei-wu Park Movement, see Tseng 
(1996:170–211). 
10
This is best illustrated by the essays in Takao Green Association for Ecology and Human 
Studies (1996).  
11
Yantze River and Yellow River are the longest and the second longest rivers, respectively, 
on Mainland China. Ai River, on the other hand, flows through the center of Kaohsiung City. 
12
The question of whether it was possible for an NGO to maintain its independent status if it 
had accepted money from the government merits more investigation. 
13
Established in 2002, the ―Community Architect System‖ was founded to encourage 
Kaohsiung City based architects to work with local communities in order to help improve the 
community environment. It encourages officials of the Kaohsiung City government, 
architects, local community residents, and construction firms to pool together their ideas in 
the design and execution of any public works projects. Director-General Charles Lin called 
this a ―process of common consciousness development and a learning opportunity for the 
whole society‖ (Dialogue 2002). 
14
Chen Shui-bian relied heavily on votes in southern counties and cities, particularly where 
the ―Southern Green Revolution‖ originated, for his victory in both the 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections (see the map of voting results by county in 
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